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Abstract
We analyze the welfare impact of entrepreneur mobility in a two-country model.
Increasing returns in production yield multiple equilibria that are stable under
adaptive learning. Governments compete for the mobile resource by setting in-
come taxes. We show that large welfare gains can arise from noncooperative tax-
ation. If expectational barriers prevent the realization of high output equilibria,
tax competition can suﬃciently perturb expectations so that high steady states
become attainable. Once in a high production regime, governments may institute
cooperative tax increases or reductions so as to bring the economy to the global
joint optimum without disturbing the regime.
Key words: competition for mobile factors, overlapping generations, multiple
equilibria, bifurcations.
JEL codes: H2, F2, D83.
1 Introduction
International tax competition has attracted much interest in recent literature. At issue
is the allocation of mobile tax bases, the location of which may be aﬀected by strategic
policy choices (in particular, tax reductions) of governments eager to attract them. The
fear is that such unilateral and aggressive tax policies could prove harmful since public
services might have to be cut as tax revenues dwindle.
Previous theoretical work has largely supported the above viewpoint. The Nash
equilibrium of the tax competition game has been shown to be inferior to the hypothetical
joint optimum attained from tax cooperation, and international tax coordination is
usually suggested as the remedy for the potential welfare loss from tax competition.
The voluminous literature that supports this view is surveyed in Wilson (1999).
There are, however, forces that can counterbalance the standard ineﬃciency argu-
ment against tax competition. Persson and Tabellini (1992) have shown, for example,
that societies can find ways of adapting their internal political systems so as to prevent
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the slide toward unacceptably low levels of public spending. Edwards and Keen (1996)
have observed that public decision makers may be self-serving and that, in such cases,
tax competition may provide a useful constraint against unproductive public expendi-
tures. Wilson and Wildasin (2004) survey these and other approaches toward modeling
potential benefits from tax competition.
In this paper, we suggest that there are still additional circumstances in which in-
ternational tax competition can be positively helpful. Our argument centers on the role
that increasing returns, expectations, and learning dynamics play in determining the
outcome of the tax competition game. While the study of nonconvexities, multiple equi-
libria, and learning have received much attention in recent macroeconomic literature, the
implications of these phenomena in microeconomic policy models remain less known.
Our goal here is to demonstrate the eﬀects of evolutionary expectations and learning
in an overlapping generations model of tax competition that possesses multiple equilib-
ria (some with high and some with low levels of output and well-being). Consideration
of the time-adjustment of the economy following a policy change allows us to identify
new positive eﬀects that arise from international tax competition. First, when there are
multiple equilibria, we show that tax competition can yield large (discrete) jumps in
well-being, thus overturning the standard argument against noncooperative tax setting.
In particular, tax competition can be much better than tax coordination if the eﬀect
of such coordination is to maintain a low productivity steady state. Second, tax com-
petition can serve as a means of breaking a low-expectations trap that prevents a high
output - high welfare equilibrium from being realized. And finally, once a high output
production regime has been established (perhaps through tax competition), carefully
chosen cooperative tax changes may be instituted so as to bring the economy from a
Nash equilibrium to the global joint optimum without disturbing the newly attained
high output regime. Thus, while expectational dynamics may cause stagnation at a low
equilibrium trap, they can also support cooperative taxation of mobile factors.
What is also interesting is that depending on the importance of increasing returns,
the cooperative tax reforms under the high output regime may include tax increases (as
in the standard tax competition argument) or tax reductions. In other words, the Nash
equilibrium in taxes, while always worse in welfare terms than the joint optimum, may
involve taxes that are lower or higher than at the cooperative welfare maximum. The
case in which unilaterally optimal taxes are higher than jointly optimal occurs when
increasing returns are suﬃciently strong.
We employ a symmetric two-country version of the overlapping generations model
of social increasing returns due to Evans and Honkapohja (1995, 2001) to derive our
results.1 Overlapping generations models are natural vehicles for studying learning be-
cause they provide a clean example of one-step forward looking behavior. In this type of
models, individuals pursue their interests given a forecast future reflected in expectations
and expectations are adjusted based on observed history of the economy, thus leading to
a dynamic process in which individuals alter their behaviors as they learn more about
1An overlapping-generations model of tax competition was also used by Wildasin and Wilson (1996)
who analyzed land-value maximizing taxation under imperfect resident mobility across jurisdictions.
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the economy. A rational expectations equilibrium is eventually attained as the outcome
of the learning process.2 The Evans and Honkapohja model is particularly attractive
in that it yields a tractable example of an overlapping generations model with multiple
equilibria. The learning dynamics in this model can be represented in terms of a single
state variable and the eﬀects of policy can be illustrated by simple diagrams. The model
also builds a microeconomic foundation for the increasing returns in employment that
can lead to multiple equilibria.
In our two-country extension of the Evans and Honkapohja model, all individuals are
taken to be potentially mobile in their first period of life. During this time period indi-
viduals work and save so as to finance retirement in the second period. Income earned in
either country is taxed according to the source principle, and the tax revenues are spent
to supply publicly provided goods and services for the retired. We deviate from the stan-
dard tax competition models by treating the mobile individuals as household-producers
(or entrepreneurs) whose labor is by nature mental, entrepreneurial, eﬀort rather than
physical work. These individuals do not exchange labor for a market wage but can,
instead, set up shop and oﬀer their services in either country depending on the available
return. Skilled professionals (IT services, consulting, entertainment, design, arts, etc.)
perhaps serve as a reasonable example. Contrary to the standard tax competition model
in which aggregate capital is mobile and in fixed supply, our framework contains sev-
eral mobile ”human capital” factors, each in endogenous supply by entrepreneurs who
respond to return opportunities in two markets. Just as mobile capital in the standard
tax competition model is allocated so as to equalize returns between markets, the en-
trepreneurs in the present model respond to tax incentives and adjust the allocation of
entrepreneurial services in the two locations. Optimal allocation of individual eﬀort is
characterized by equality of the real returns to it.3
Tax competition that results in lower taxation combined with international mobility
of entrepreneurs can yield strong incentives to expand output. In our model, this eﬀect
is magnified by increasing social returns in a certain range of aggregate entrepreneurial
eﬀort. In particular, we assume that while eﬀort by each individual (firm) is subject
to decreasing returns in each location, external gains in productivity are reaped if the
aggregate activity in a location exceeds a minimum threshold level. It is the interaction
of these positive productivity externalities and the decreasing returns to individual ef-
fort that gives raise to multiple potential equilibria. Given this multiplicity, endogenous
movements from one steady state to another can take place, and we are particularly
interested in showing that tax competition can be a source of strongly favorable bifur-
cations in equilibria.4
2For an exhaustive discussion of adaptive learning, see Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
3Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (DLR) (2002) have analyzed location decisions of mobile firms
when countries compete in corporate taxation and financial capital is internationally mobile. The
individual producers of our model are analogous to the mobile entrepreneurs of DLR, a diﬀerence being
that we allow individuals to operate in both locations if doing so is profitable.
4The benefits from tax competition that we highlight arise from an expansion in aggregate entrepre-
neurial eﬀort and are diﬀerent from agglomeration eﬀects in core-periphery models (see Baldwin and
Krugman (2004)).
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Learning dynamics allow us to classify potential equilibria into those that are stable
under adaptive learning and those that are unstable. Stable equilibria are approached
via an expectational adjustment process along which individual entrepreneurs observe
the economy, adjust their forecasts for the future, and learn about the equilibrium values
of the model variables. Since unstable equilibria cannot be approached by such small,
gradual, steps, an unstable steady state that separates a high output equilibrium from
a low steady state forms an expectational barrier that cannot be easily overcome. Only
discrete changes in policy or other exogenous disturbances of suﬃcient size can perturb
the prevailing expectations so as to cause an upward jump in the performance of the
economy. We show that tax competition can serve in this welfare improving role.
2 Model
In this section, we expand the Evans and Honkapohja (1995, 2001) overlapping genera-
tions model to include two symmetric countries, H(ome) and F (oreign).
2.1 Production Technology
At any point in time, both countries H and F are the birthplace of a fixed number
(K) individuals (entrepreneurs) who live for two time periods. Because of the assumed
symmetry of the two economies, we discuss the model from the point of view of a
representative individual born in country H in the beginning of time period t. Unless
otherwise noted, all definitions and equations possess analogous counterparts that apply
in country F .
In their first period of life, entrepreneurs invest in eﬀort and produce a private con-
sumption commodity which is sold to the currently retired. Given an entrepreneur-
specific fixed factor (”firm”), the output of each individual is equal to
f(nj, Nj) = n
α
jΨ(Nj), j = H,F , (1)
in the two locations. Here nj refers to individual eﬀort invested in either location (H or
F ), while Nj denotes the total supply of entrepreneurship in either country. We assume
that α < 1 so that decreasing returns to eﬀort prevail given a fixed value of Ψ(.). For
simplicity, the production function is assumed to be the same in each location, i.e., f
does not depend directly on j.5
Increasing external returns to entrepreneurship are represented by the function Ψ
in (1). This function is taken to be increasing in Nj; thus, the larger the total supply
of entrepreneurial eﬀort in country j, the higher the productivity of each firm in that
country. A particular functional form for social returns has been suggested by Evans
and Honkapohja (1995). According to this specification,
Ψ(Nj) = max
hbI, Ijiβ , bI > 0, β ≥ 1, (2)
5We assume that all entrepreneurs can produce in both locations without additional (firm-specific
or common) costs. Such costs could be included in the model without material changes in the results.
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Ij ≡
λNj
1 + aλNj
, λ ∈ (0, 1) , a > 0, (3)
where j = H,F . By (2) and (3), an indicator of total entrepreneurial activity in a
location, Ij, must exceed an exogenous threshold value, bI, before external productivity
gains can be felt. If Ij is larger than bI then, according to (2), Ψ(Nj) = Iβj in all
production functions (1). Otherwise, there are no social returns and the production
functions (1) just include the multiplying constant bIβ.
The measure of entrepreneurial activity, Ij, reflects the sharing of experiences and
ideas that naturally takes place when firms operate in proximity to each other. We
assume that new ideas are created and broadcast at a uniform rate and that, for each
particular firm, the fraction λ of all ideas is suitable to be applied. If it takes a time
units to absorb a suitable new idea, then the total time required to receive and apply
an idea equals a+(λNj)−1. Per unit of time, therefore, the total number of usable ideas
that any firm receives is Ij, as specified in (3). This quantity of usable ideas enters the
firm-specific production functions as specified in (1) and (2). Because Ij is increasing
in the total entrepreneurial activity at a location, external productivity gains increase
with aggregate eﬀort. There is, however, an upper bound for these gains: by (3), Ij
approaches 1/a as Nj becomes very large.
2.2 Overlapping Generations
Individuals derive well-being from private consumption and from access to public ser-
vices. The utility function of a representative individual born in country H at the
beginning of time period t is taken to be
WH = U(cH,t+1)− V (nHt + nFt) + µU(GH,t+1). (4)
In (4), cH,t+1 denotes private consumption in retirement and µ reflects the importance
of publicly provided benefits, GH,t+1. Disutility of eﬀort is represented by the function
V . The utility functions U and U are assumed to be increasing and concave, while V is
taken to be increasing and convex.6
National governments finance public consumption by appropriating a fraction τ j of
output in the country in each period. Accordingly, we have
τ jYjt = Gjt, j = H,F, (5)
where Yjt equals the total (per capita) output in country j in period t and τ j defines
the national tax rate on entrepreneurial returns.7 The subsequent (anticipated) budget
6The specification (4) implies that only public services provided by one’s home country can be used
when retired. This precludes the motivation to migrate so as to attain access to public benefits in the
other country.
7In country H, YHt = f(nHt, NHt) + f(n∗Ht, NHt) and NHt = K(nHt + n∗Ht), where n∗Ht equals the
entrepreneurial eﬀort invested by Foreign entrepreneurs in H in time period t. Analogous definitions
apply in country F .
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constraints that apply to all individuals born in H at the beginning of time period t are
(1− τH)ptf(nHt, NHt) + (1− τF )ptf(nFt, NFt) = mt, (6)
pet+1cH,t+1 = mt. (7)
In (6) and (7), pt and pet+1 stand for the current and the anticipated future world price
of private consumption (in money), respectively. Equation (6) defines the after-taxes
income, mt (measured in money), that each entrepreneur plans to spend in retirement
in time period t + 1 subject to the budget constraint (7). For simplicity, we assume
that all (identical) individuals have identical price forecasts pet+1. Money is taken to be
the only means of transferring purchasing power from one time period to the next, and
the two countries are assumed to have a common currency. The world stock of money
remains always constant.
Entrepreneurs choose the quantity of eﬀort in each location by maximizing (4) subject
to the budget constraints (6) and (7). In this choice, Nj and Gj are treated as given,
whereby first-order conditions for an interior optimum take the form8
V 0(nHt + nFt)
U 0(cH,t+1)
= (1− τ j)f 01(njt, Njt)
pt
pet+1
, j = H,F. (8)
Accordingly, the optimal nHt and nFt are such that an entrepreneur’s marginal rate
of substitution between eﬀort and future consumption (on the left-hand side of (8))
is equal to the expected real return (in consumption) to such eﬀort in both locations.
Entrepreneurial activity is thus allocated so that the anticipated real returns to eﬀort
are equalized.
The world market for private consumption clears in every time period so that the
world (per capita) consumption, CWt = cHt + cFt, is equal to the world (per capita)
output, i.e.,
CWt = (1− τH)YHt + (1− τF )YFt = Yt, ∀t. (9)
Market clearing also requires that the nominal savings of the young generation equal
the world stock of money. If we set the constant world money stock equal to M , then
CWt =M/pt for all t and therefore
pt
pet+1
=
(1− τH)Y eH,t+1 + (1− τF )Y eF,t+1
(1− τH)YHt + (1− τF )YFt
=
Y et+1
Yt
. (10)
Substituting the price ratio (10) into the first order conditions (8) and the corresponding
equations for individuals born in country F we obtain four oﬀer curve equations that
express the allocation of entrepreneurial eﬀort across the two countries in time period t,
nt, as a function of the anticipated future amount of eﬀort, net+1.
9 For the entrepreneurs
8Notation: f 01 denotes the partial derivative of the function f with respect to its first argument.
9We formulate expectations and learning in a simple way using the level of employment rather than
prices. Agents know that, by (1), Y et+1 is a function of future employment net+1 which for brevity is
assumed to be the same for all agents. By introducing price expectations, these assumptions could be
relaxed without altering our results.
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born in H, these equations require
V 0(nHt + nFt)
U 0(ceH,t+1)
= (1− τ j)f 01(njt,Njt)
Y et+1
Yt
, j = H,F, (11)
where
ceH,t+1 =
[(1− τH)f(nHt, NHt) + (1− τF )f(nFt, NFt)]Y et+1
Yt
. (12)
Equations (11)-(12) together with the corresponding oﬀer curves of individuals born in
F determine the evolution of entrepreneurial eﬀort in both countries over time.
The rational expectations (perfect foresight) equilibria are identified by the additional
condition that expectations are correct, i.e., net+1 = nt+1. In the following section we
adopt specific functional forms for the utility functions U, U and V , and illustrate the
typical configurations of perfect foresight equilibria within the present model.
2.3 Symmetric Equilibria
We only consider symmetric equilibria at which τH = τF = τ . Furthermore, for the
purpose of illustrations, we set
U(c) =
c1−σ
1− σ , V (n) = n, U(G) =
G1−σ
1− σ , 0 < σ < 1. (13)
Substituting these utility functions into (11) and taking into account that, due to sym-
metry, each entrepreneur devotes equal amounts of eﬀort to both locations (whereby
Yjt = 2f(njt, Njt) and Njt = 2Knjt, j = H,F ) we obtain the oﬀer curve equation
nt = 2−σα(1− τ)1−σ(net+1)α(1−σ)max
·bI, λNt+1
1 + aλNt+1
¸β(1−σ)
≡ F (τ , net+1). (14)
Conditional on τ and net+1, this oﬀer curve determines the amount of entrepreneurial
eﬀort that all individuals invest in each country and subscript references to H and F
have accordingly been dropped.
FIGURE 1: Oﬀer Curves and Steady States.
Some typical oﬀer curves derived from (14) are depicted in Figure 1. The concave
segments of the oﬀer curves obtain when, in comparison to the individual decreasing
returns, the externality gains in the production technology (1) are suﬃciently small.
Along the first concave segment, to the left of the kink on each curve, there are no
externalities at all (in this region, Ij < bI; the kink occurs when Ij = bI). Above the
critical value nbI at which externalities become operative (i.e., Ij(nbI) = bI), a convex
segment appears when increasing returns are suﬃciently strong. At still higher levels of
employment oﬀer curves eventually turn concave because the positive externality eﬀect
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is bounded from above. This yields the second concave region on the oﬀer curves in
Figure 1.10
Perfect foresight steady states are given in Figure 1 as the intersections of the oﬀer
curves with the 45-degree line (at these equilibria, net+1 = nt+1 = nt).
11 As shown in the
figure, three alternatives exist as to the interior steady states. (In addition, the autarky
equilibrium nt = 0 always exists.) First, there may be a unique interior steady state
to the left of the kink (equilibrium nLow on the oﬀer curve F ). At such an equilibrium,
young generations work relatively little, and output and consumption are low. Second, a
unique steady state may occur to the right of the kink (equilibrium nNEHigh on F
NE
High). At
nNEHigh, positive externalities are present and output and consumption are therefore high.
The third possibility is that there are multiple interior steady states as illustrated by
n0Low, nU , and n
0
High along F
0. At n0Low, the realized output and consumption are much
lower than at the high equilibrium n0High. It is easy to see that welfare is predictably
aﬀected: for any given level of taxation, welfare is an increasing function of n across
steady states so that all individuals are better oﬀ at n0High than at n
0
Low.
2.4 Learning Dynamics
We introduce dynamic adjustment paths toward rational expectations steady states
using the adaptive learning approach. The basic idea is to begin with a particular
forecast value of future eﬀort, net+1. Given n
e
t+1, individuals choose their preferred level
current eﬀort, nt, as described above. The resulting nt defines the temporary equilibrium
that corresponds to the initial expectations, net+1. If the realized temporary equilibrium
in time period t diﬀers from what was previously forecast for this time period (i.e., a
rational expectations equilibrium was not attained), then individuals are assumed to
revise their expectations. Such a revision yields the subsequent, improved, forecast,
net+2, which in turn defines a new temporary equilibrium in time period t + 1. If the
observed expectational errors diminish over time as forecasts are updated and behavior
adjusts, a rational expectations steady state is eventually attained. Such an equilibrium
is called stable under adaptive learning. Equilibria that are unstable under adaptive
learning cannot be approached along these sorts of adaptive learning paths.
The temporary equilibrium that corresponds to a given net+1 can be read oﬀ the
appropriate oﬀer curve (14) (as illustrated in Figure 1), i.e.,
nt = F (τ , net+1). (15)
We combine equation (15) with a simple description of expectational adjustments:
net+1 = n
e
t +
κ
t
([F (τ , net)]− net), κ > 0. (16)
According to this learning rule, individuals revise their expectations by an amount that
is proportional to the previously observed forecast error. The proportionality factor
10Appendix C contains a detailed discussion of the concave and convex segments of the oﬀer curve.
11For simplicity, we do not consider other ”non-fundamental” rational expectations equilibria that
exist in this model (e.g., sunspot equilibria).
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κ/t is known as the gain parameter, and it determines the extent to which forecast
errors are taken into account. If we set κ = 1 and select appropriate initial conditions,
the forecast net+1 is equal to the average of past values of nt; in this case, individuals
estimate the future supply of entrepreneurial eﬀort by updating the sample mean of
previous observations.12 Equation (16) makes it clear that expectations depend on tax
policy: the amount by which expectations are updated is a function of τ and thus any
change in τ will have an impact on expectational dynamics.
Equations (15) and (16) define the dynamic adjustment paths toward rational ex-
pectations steady states. Proposition 1 of Evans and Honkapohja (1995, p. 225) can
be extended so as to identify the stability properties of these types of equilibria. In
particular, the interior steady states at which an oﬀer curve cuts the 45◦-line from above
(e.g., n0Low and n
0
High along oﬀer curve F
0) are stable under learning, whereas equilibria
at which the 45◦-line cuts the oﬀer curve from below are unstable (e.g., nU on F 0). This
means that for all initial expectations that fall between zero and nU , learning dynamics
converge to the low equilibrium at n0Low, whereas for all n
e
t+1 larger than nU , the stable
final equilibrium is n0High. All unique interior steady states (such as nLow and n
NE
High)
are necessarily stable. It is clear from Figure 1 that, excluding unusual circumstances,
unstable steady states, when they exist, will be located between two steady states that
are stable under adaptive learning.
3 Gains from Tax Competition
In this section we analyze the consequences of cooperative and noncooperative tax poli-
cies for the steady state equilibria. We place particular emphasis on the role of multiple
equilibria and expectations as these are the source of our sometimes counterintuitive
results. To establish a connection to previous tax competition models we first discuss
tax policy under the low productivity regime where externalities are not operative.
3.1 Standard Results in the Low Regime
Suppose that a steady state occurs at nLow on oﬀer curve F in Figure 1. Let the common
tax rate at nLow be τ
opt
Low and suppose this tax rate is locally jointly optimal. By this we
mean that τ optLow maximizes the joint welfare of the two countries, H and F , given that
the level of entrepreneurial eﬀort is too low for productive externalities to arise.
Individual well-being as a function of the common tax rate near nLow is depicted by
the curve labeled WLow in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2: Taxes and Welfare
Curve WLow has an inverted U-shape if public services have a positive weight in prefer-
ences, i.e., µ > 0 in (4). This condition guarantees that individuals prefer some positive
12This formulation for learning about steady states is common in the recent literature. See Chapter
11 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
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tax rate and public benefits to zero taxation with no public benefits (Appendix D gives
formal arguments).
Let W j(τH , τF ), j = H,F , denote steady state welfare for given tax rates (τH , τF ).
At the joint optimum nLow both countries perceive an unilateral incentive to reduce tax-
ation if per capita welfare is decreasing in the domestic tax rate (∂W j(τH , τF )/∂τ j < 0,
j = H,F, when τH = τF = τ
opt
Low). This is typically the case as we show in Appendix
E. If each country follows its unilateralist impulse at nLow and lowers its tax rate, the
symmetric steady state moves left from nLow alongWLow.13 That the final Nash equilib-
rium at nNELow is worse in welfare terms than the joint optimum at nLow is the standard
argument against international tax competition. Furthermore, the relative location of
nNELow and nLow on WLow yields the standard policy recommendation: the two countries
should cooperate and move toward higher taxation until the joint optimum at nLow is
re-established.
A particular numerical example of the usual tax competition argument is obtained
by choosing the parameter values α = 0.9, σ = 0.6, bI = 0.5 and µ = 1 in (2), (3) and
(13). The jointly optimal tax rate, the Nash tax rate, and the corresponding levels of
well-being are given in Table 1.14
TABLE 1: Standard Tax Competition in the Low Regime
Parameters: α = 0.9, σ = 0.6, bI = 0.5, µ = 1.
Nash Equilibrium Joint Optimum
τ 0.14 0.35
W 0.86 1.53
3.2 Switching Production Regimes
The example in Table 1 is special in that neither competitive nor cooperative changes
in taxes alter the prevailing production regime. That is, both at the joint optimum at
nLow and at the Nash equilibrium at nNELow, there is no role for social returns in individual
production functions. In Figure 2, this constancy of the production regime means that
both the initial and the new steady states lie on the same welfare curve, namely WLow.
In Figure 1, this means that both nLow and nNELow occur on oﬀer curves (such as F and
FNELow, respectively) that intersect the 45-degree line along the first concave segment of
each respective curve. The oﬀer curve that yields the Nash equilibrium, FNELow say, lies
above F because, given any positive net+1, all individuals invest more eﬀort in production
when taxes are lower (see equation (14)).
13For simplicity, we assume that individual learning is fast compared to the pace at which tax re-
ductions take place. This guarantees that the temporary equilibria that are observed as the economies
adjust toward a new symmetric steady state occur near the WLow curve, which is then a reasonable
approximation to adjustment paths.
14The Mathematica programs that were used to develop the numerical examples in this paper are
available from the authors upon request. Note that, as long as we remain in the low production regime
where externalities are not observed (as in Table 1), it is not necessary to specify the values of the
parameters a, λ, and K that define the externality function Ψ(.).
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Outcomes that are significantly diﬀerent can occur for alternative parameter values.
If the positive response to reduced taxation is suﬃciently large, the oﬀer curve that yields
the Nash equilibrium can reach a position such as depicted by curve FNEHigh in Figure 1.
In such a case, following a period of adjustment during which expectations consistently
point toward expansion and all individuals continuously increase production, a steady
state is attained at nNEHigh on F
NE
High. The switch from a low joint optimum at nLow on
oﬀer curve F to a Nash equilibrium at nNEHigh on F
NE
High is not a smooth local perturbation
near an initial steady state (such as in Table 1) but involves a move from one production
regime to another (a bifurcation): on FNEHigh the low productivity steady state near nlow
no longer exists, and a high output production regime near nNEHigh, along the second
concave segment of the oﬀer curve, has appeared.
The discrete improvement in individual well-being that accompanies the movement
from nLow to nNEHigh is shown in Figure 2. The Nash equilibrium now occurs on curve
WHigh which, depending on the strength of external productivity gains, can be located
much above WLow. This means that, irrespective of the standard arguments against
tax competition, there are cases in which tax competition can play a positive role. In
particular, when the supply of a mobile resource is highly responsive to tax reductions due
to external returns, tax competition can push the competing economies well beyond their
customary levels of performance. Thus, tax competition need not always be a ”race to
the bottom”; outcomes that are worse can persist if coordinated policy of higher taxation
ends up maintaining a low productivity regime.15
Table 2 gives a numerical example illustrating the switch in the production regime.
(We postpone the discussion regarding the systematic diﬀerences between the parameter
values in Tables 1 and 2 to Section 4 below.)
TABLE 2: Switching Production Regimes
Parameters:
α = 0.5, β = 2.5, a = 0.2, λ = 0.02,bI = 0.97, K = 300, σ = 0.25, µ = 2.5.
Low
Joint Optimum
High
Nash Equilibrium
High
Joint Optimum
τ 0.50 0.43 0.44
W 1.55 206.72 206.74
Of course, bifurcation gains from tax competition cannot exist unless multiple pro-
duction regimes can occur. In the present model, the source of the potential multiplicity
is the externality function Ψ(.) that includes an externality threshold. Depending on
the height of this threshold and the amount of aggregate eﬀort invested by individuals
either a low or a high productivity regime is attained.16
15Bhagwati (2002) has argued that the race-to-the-bottom nature of tax competition is little supported
by empirical evidence.
16Technological complementarities can also create multiple production regimes. See Honkapohja and
Turunen-Red (2002).
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Even when multiple production regimes are present, there is an additional consider-
ation that can prevent the favorable regime switch. At issue is the location of the low
productivity Nash equilibrium that generally exists on curve WLow in Figure 2. If, as
shown in Figure 2, this low Nash equilibrium occurs suﬃciently near the joint optimum
at nLow, then, despite tax competition that lowers taxes, there is no regime switch; the
tax reductions in this case are not large enough to cause a jump from curve WLow to
WHigh because the high productivity steady state does not exist near nLow (in Figure 1,
while the oﬀer curve pivots up to a position shown by FNELow, the Nash equilibrium is still
found on the first concave segment of the oﬀer curve where no social externalities exist).
If, on the other hand, the low Nash equilibrium lies suitably far to the left from the
joint optimum on WLow (along the dotted segment of WLow in Figure 2), then a process
of tax reductions that approaches this Nash equilibrium necessarily involves a jump to
the high equilibrium regime. This is because the low productivity steady state ceases
to exist as the common tax rate is reduced below the cut-oﬀ value τ cut in Figure 2 (in
Figure 1, the low steady state disappears as the oﬀer curve pivots up and approaches
a position such as illustrated by curve FNEHig ). Below τ cut, the competitive tax reduc-
tion and learning process converges to the high productivity Nash equilibrium nNEHigh on
WHigh and a discrete jump in well-being, such as illustrated by the numerical example
in Table 2, must exist.
The cut-oﬀ tax, τ cut, is the lowest common tax rate at which the low productivity
equilibrium exists. By (2) and (3) and given all parameter values, τ cut can be solved
from the equation bI = 2λKn(τ)
1 + 2aλKn(τ)
, (17)
where n(τ ) is the steady state solution for eﬀort in the low productivity regime as
obtained from the oﬀer curve equation (14), i.e.,
n(τ ) = 2−
σ
zα
1
z (1− τ ) 1−σz bI β(1−σ)z , z ≡ 1− α(1− σ). (18)
For the parameter values in Table 2 for which a regime switch does exist, the cut-
oﬀ tax equals τ cut = 0.495 and the low Nash equilibrium to the left of it occurs at
τNELow = 0.48. To illustrate the alternative possibility, we can expand our first example in
Table 1 by augmenting that parameter set by the following: β = 2.5, a = 0.2, λ = 0.02
and K = 100. Then, τ cut = 0.11 which is smaller than the low Nash equilibrium tax
τNELow = 0.14; for these parameter values a tax competition process that begins from the
low joint optimum at τNELow = 0.35 can only yield a local deterioration in welfare.
While suﬃcient conditions characterizing the relative location of the cut-oﬀ tax and
the low productivity Nash equilibrium are not available, we can point out circumstances
in which a bifurcation from tax competition is more likely. Generally, this is the case
when the value of the cut-oﬀ tax is high, i.e., the productive externality is relatively easy
to reach. This happens when new ideas are adopted quickly (a is small), a large fraction
of ideas is suitable for others to use (λ is high), the population is large (K is large), and
the externality is substantial (β is high). While one would expect that a low externality
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threshold bI would also raise the cut-oﬀ tax and therefore make a bifurcation of steady
states more likely this is not always the case. Because the steady state solution n(τ)
in (18) depends on bI the cut-oﬀ tax may decline when the threshold parameter bI gets
smaller (details of these eﬀects are given in Appendix F).17
When the externality threshold is high and/or the low productivity Nash equilibrium
prevents the high output regime from being reached via competitive tax reductions,
there is a new role for cooperative policy. In this case and in contrast to the standard
tax coordination recommendation, the optimal coordinated policy now requires that,
starting from the low joint optimum, taxes are reduced below the cut-oﬀ tax rate so that
the high productivity regime is attained. The cooperative tax reductions should continue
until the high regime optimum at τ optHigh is reached. Figure 2 illustrates.
3.3 Breaking Expectational Barriers
A further result can be obtained using Figures 1 and 2, and this brings forth the role of
expectational dynamics.
Assume, as earlier, that the initial equilibrium is located at nLow on oﬀer curve F
in Figure 1 where the common tax rate is τ optLow. Suppose that, in an eﬀort to guide the
economy toward the higher productivity regime, the two countries undertake a joint tax
reduction. As a result, the oﬀer curve pivots up; let it reach the position F 0.18
The shift from oﬀer curve F to F 0 in Figure 1 yields a bifurcation which is diﬀerent
from the shift from F to FNEHigh discussed above. The bifurcation from F to F
0 expands
the set of equilibria: while the low output steady state still exists on F 0 at n0Low, two
additional equilibria at nU and n0High now appear. Of these three, the high steady state
at n0High is clearly the most desirable one as welfare there is the highest. The question
becomes: can the steady state at n0High be actually reached, if initial expectations support
the low equilibrium at nLow? In view of what has been assumed about expectational
dynamics this cannot be the case.
While entrepreneurs do respond positively and expectations are adjusted upwards
as taxes decline, these expectational dynamics come to a halt once the steady state at
n0Low on F
0 is reached. This occurs because n0Low is a stable equilibrium under adaptive
learning. Accordingly, to the left of n0Low, expectations and behavior are adjusted toward
n0Low; to the right of n
0
Low, an analogous adjustment process brings realized temporary
equilibria back to n0Low. The presence of the unstable steady state at nU guarantees that
n0High cannot be attained.
Figure 1, however, suggests a remedy for the expectational impasse that supports
the low productivity steady state: taxes must be cut more decisively so that the hold
of low expectations is broken. In Figure 1, this requires that oﬀer curve F 0 pivots up
17For example, the value of bI is lower in Table 1 than in Table 2 and yet the parameter set of Table 2
yields a bifurcation jump in well-being whereas the augmented parameter set of Table 1 does not. See
Section 4 below for a complete discussion.
18In Figure 2, this tax reduction corresponds to a leftward movement along curveWLow to the region
of WLow, above τ cut, where the high equilibrium (curve WHigh) also exists.
13
suﬃciently far so that both the low steady state near n0Low and the unstable equilibrium
at nU cease to exist. But, according to our previous discussion and assuming that the
low output Nash equilibrium nNELow does not pose a barrier (i.e., τ
NE
Low < τ cut in Figure
2), tax competition between the two countries can be a means of reaching this precise
outcome (compare oﬀer curves F 0 and FNEHigh in Figure 1).
19
While it is true that in a situation such as depicted in Figure 1 governments have an
incentive to cooperate and by doing so they may be able to attain a high output state
(near noptHigh in Figure 2), our point is that, even if such policy cooperation were feasible
and suﬃciently eﬀective, it may not yield very significant further welfare gains. Seem-
ingly noncooperative policies can yield an outcome (nNEHigh on curve WHigh in Figure 2)
that is significantly better than the initial, perhaps cooperative, equilibrium. Regarded
this way, tax competition may at times be a reasonable substitute for tax cooperation
when such coordinated action is not possible.
4 Nash Equilibrium and Policy in the High Regime
Thus far, we have emphasized the role of tax competition in reaching the high pro-
ductivity regime when external social gains potentially exist. When tax reductions are
uncoordinated, one may worry about the relative ineﬃciency of the final Nash equilib-
rium (it will be worse in welfare terms than the potential joint optimum on curve WHigh
in Figure 2) and whether it is possible to aim for the global joint social optimum (on
WHigh) without simultaneously destroying the positive incentives and expectations that
support the high output regime.
Fortunately, we may appeal to the same expectational inertia that, in the previous
section, created the low equilibrium trap. In the case here, once the high productivity
regime near the high employment Nash equilibrium (at nNEHigh onWHigh) has been estab-
lished, a coordinated tax reform toward the global optimum can be undertaken without
causing a plunge back to the low productivity state. This is because expectational inertia
maintains the high steady state near nNEHigh once this equilibrium has been realized. Only
a very large increase in taxation that severely impacts expectations can re-establish the
low productivity steady state. In Figure 2, this sort of a tax increase would have to raise
the common tax above the rate τucut that denotes the upper limit of taxation at which
both the high steady state and the unstable equilibrium near nU cease to exist. In Figure
1, this corresponds to oﬀer curve FNEHigh pivoting down to a position near curve F . A shift
from curve FNEHigh to F
0 would not suﬃce because as long as the unstable steady state
exists it serves as an expectational barrier that supports the high productivity regime.
There is also an issue about the direction of the optimal coordinated policy in the high
regime. Above, and in Figure 2 as well, we have maintained the usual intuition whereby
taxes at the Nash equilibrium are necessarily lower than what is socially optimal. Then,
the optimal intervention at the Nash equilibrium is a coordinated tax increase. But,
19However, if τNELow ≥ τ cut tax competition must be supplemented by further cooperative tax reduc-
tions.
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as it turns out, this is not always the case. When productive externalities are strong,
it is quite possible that the Nash equilibrium in taxes in the high productivity regime
occurs to the right of the joint optimum (on curve WHigh in Figure 2). In this case,
the noncooperatively established Nash taxes are actually higher than what is socially
optimal and the optimal coordinated policy should aim toward reducing them further.
Table 3 gives a numerical example.20
TABLE 3: Nash Equilibrium and Social Optimum
Parameters:
α = 0.9, β = 2.5, a = 0.2, λ = 0.02,bI = 0.75, K = 100, σ = 0.6, µ = 1.
Low
Joint Optimum
High
Nash Equilibrium
High
Joint Optimum
τ 0.35 0.32 0.17
W 1.70 15.62 17.81
This raises the question about the relative location of the high Nash equilibrium
and the global joint optimum. In particular, what is the role of the various parameter
assumptions in creating a paradoxical case such as in Table 3, and when does the usual
intuition about the Nash equilibrium prevail (as in Table 2)? Some light can be shed on
this issue with the help of Figure 3 and Tables 4A and 4B below.
FIGURE 3: Eﬀort Regions in the High Regime
Whether the Nash equilibrium involves taxes that are lower or higher than what
is jointly optimal depends on the sign of the unilateral welfare derivative at the joint
optimum. If ∂WH(τH , τF )/∂τH < 0 when τH = τF = τ
opt
Low, country H will compete
with country F by lowering its tax rate and the Nash equilibrium then occurs to the left
of the joint optimum. In the opposite case, when ∂WH(τH , τF )/∂τH > 0 at the joint
optimum, each country will raise its domestic tax whereby the Nash equilibrium must
lie to the right of the optimum.
The sign of the welfare derivative ∂WH(τH , τF )/∂τH , in turn, crucially depends
on the direction and size of the reactions in (steady state) entrepreneurial eﬀort when
taxes are changed. Of particular importance are the derivatives ∂nH(τH , τF )/∂τH and
(∂nH(.)/∂τH + ∂nF (.)/∂τH) that indicate the changes in the domestic supply of eﬀort
and the total (domestic and exported) supply of eﬀort in each country (see equation (76)
in Appendix E). Expressions for these derivatives are obtained in Appendices A and B
below, and Appendix B also determines the boundary values for the regions in which the
signs of the derivatives ∂nH/∂τH and ∂nF/∂τH vary. These possibilities are indicated
by the signs of the derivatives in Figure 3, where the boundary values are denoted by
20For the parameter values of Table 3, τcut = 0.326 > τNEHigh = 0.32, so that tax competition that
starts from the low joint optimum does cause a shift to the high productivity regime. The low Nash
equilibrium does not pose a barrier to the jump because τNELow = 0.15 < τcut = 0.326.
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nIˆ , n4, n3 and n1.
21 In Appendix B, the various regions are discussed as Cases (i) - (v),
which are also shown in Figure 3.
If there are no productive externalities at all, ∂nH/∂τH < 0 and ∂nF/∂τH > 0 as
intuition would suggest. In Figure 3, this no externality region occurs to the left of nbI
which is the level of individual eﬀort that, when aggregated across all entrepreneurs,
yields a total supply of eﬀort precisely equal to the externality threshold. Thus, to the
right of nbI the positive externality is present. In this region, when the entrepreneurs work
suﬃciently hard, the impact of the externality is eventually mitigated by the individual
decreasing returns (recall the discussion of the production function (1)). There is a limit
value n1, so that when n > n1 we again have ∂nH/∂τH < 0 and ∂nF/∂τH > 0. Below n1,
where the impact of the externality is stronger, the derivatives ∂nH/∂τH and ∂nF/∂τH
can take opposite signs as shown in Figure 3. As an extreme example, in the region
n ∈ (nbI , n4) both eﬀort derivatives are positive. Table 4A gives the boundary values of
eﬀort obtained using the parameters in Tables 2 and 3.
TABLE 4A:
Eﬀort Derivative
Regions TABLE 4B:
Eﬀort Value
Range
Table 2
parameters
Table 3
parameters
n1 9.99 30
n3 1.15 2.43
n4 0.83 0.70
nbI 0.10 0.22
Table 2
parameters
Table 3
parameters
nmax 29.98 3.33
nmin 12.47 2.24
nNEHigh 14.62 2.26
noptHigh 14.30 2.79
It is because the signs of the nH and nF derivatives at the joint optimum can vary
that the Nash equilibrium in taxes in the high regime can be located on either side of the
joint optimum. The boundary values, nbI , ..., n1, depend on the technology parameters
(α; a, λ, β,K) and the preference parameter σ, and these parameters also determine the
range of the actual values of eﬀort that can be realized at symmetric steady states,
including the joint optimum. The symmetric n-solution n(τ ) can be computed from the
oﬀer curve equation (14), from which we can obtain the maximum value of eﬀort, nmax,
as the value n(0), while the the smallest level of eﬀort, nmin, equals n(τ cut).22 Table
4B gives the range of n-values for the parameters in Tables 2 and 3. In Figure 3, these
ranges are shown as the two shaded bars, labeled Table 2 and Table 3 respectively.
Recall that the parameter values in Table 2 yield the high Nash equilibrium in which
taxes are lower than jointly optimal, whereas the parameters in Table 3 give the oppo-
site conclusion. Using Figure 3, we can clearly detect that the two examples are very
diﬀerent. The parameters in Table 2 yield a range of feasible values of eﬀort that falls in
21In fact, Figure 3 and the Appendices use the more convenient derivatives bnH ≡ (∂nH/∂τH)/nH
and bnF ≡ (∂nF/∂τH)/nF .
22Note that nmin = n(τ cut) as long as both the joint optimum and the Nash equilibrium in the high
regime occur to the left of τcut in Figure 2.
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its entirety within the area n > n1 where a reduction in τH expands domestic activity
at the expense of eﬀort directed to the foreign market. It is in this example that the
Nash taxes are lower than optimal. For the parameters in Table 3, however, the range of
steady state values for n falls to one of the regions (n4, n3) or (n3, n2) where the eﬀect of
the externality is stronger. Here, entrepreneurial eﬀort does not respond to taxation as
usually expected and because of this there is little incentive to reduce taxes. The Nash
equilibrium tax rate in the high regime consequently remains close to the cut-oﬀ tax
τ cut (= 0.326) and while the modest tax reduction to τNEHigh (= 0.32) yields a bifurcation
jump in welfare, a tax rate that is much lower is globally jointly optimal.
Though changes in parameter values have been minimized in Tables 2 and 3, there
are systematic diﬀerences between them. First, while the externality parameters a, λ,
and β are the same in both tables, the number of entrepreneurs is larger in Table 2. The
larger population raises the value of the externality function Ψ(.) and reduces nbI , ..., n1,
thus pushing the n-value range to the right in Figure 3. This works toward reducing the
Nash equilibrium tax. An analogous eﬀect is obtained by choosing a lower value of α
(= 0.5) in Table 2 than in Table 3 (α = 0.9). By this change, the impact of diminishing
returns is made larger in Table 2 and this further reduces n1. The preference parameter
σ is higher in Table 3 than in Table 2 and this magnifies the previous changes by reducing
incentive to work in Table 3 (when σ is high, less utility is attained from any given level
of consumption). Finally, the weight of public consumption in preferences, µ, is higher
in Table 2; the added importance of public consumption raises the jointly optimal tax
rate and mitigates the impact of the production externality that tends to lower it.
In sum, the numerical examples established by Tables 2 and 3 show that, depending
on the location of the local Nash equilibrium with externality, the optimal coordinated
policy in the high production regime may involve both tax increases and tax reductions.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed entrepreneur mobility and tax competition in a simple
two-country overlapping generations model. A special feature of the model is the multi-
plicity of equilibria that reflects the possibility of increasing social returns in production.
Learning dynamics play an important role in identifying the steady states that are sta-
ble under adaptive adjustment of expectations. This sort of dynamics can influence the
outcome of the tax competition game by determining production regime that unilateral
tax reduction can attain.
We have shown that there are circumstances in which competitive tax setting can
positively enhance (and not reduce) the gains from factor mobility. In particular, tax
competition can be the source of large bifurcational gains in welfare. In the present
model, such gains are realized when unilateral tax reductions cause a suﬃciently large
shift in the supply of entrepreneurial eﬀort and this change significantly alters individual
expectations. Then, it may be possible for the economy to reach a new high eﬀort, high
output, steady state in which external benefits from the high level of activity are realized.
Because expectations have an eﬀect on the current supply of eﬀort, the large gains
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that potentially exist may not be reaped if individual expectations remain persistently
low (this happens when the existence of an unstable equilibrium creates a trap that
expectational dynamics cannot overcome). In such circumstances, tax competition may
be helpful because it can significantly perturb the status quo, thus encouraging all in-
dividuals to work much harder. Most significantly, once the existence of a new high
output production regime has been learned by all, this high productivity steady state
can still be sustained even if some further cooperative tax increases are undertaken. In
other words, the seemingly radical policy choice of free tax competition combined with
cooperative tax increases at a later stage may sometimes yield better results than a
gradual, cooperative, approach that never shocks expectations out of their present rut
and fails to reach the economy’s highest potential.
Of course, bifurcational gains from tax competition are conditional on the existence
of multiple equilibria that are stable under adaptive learning. In the present paper, in an
eﬀort to make the analysis as transparent as possible, we have used a simple threshold
externality and specific functional forms to create such multiplicity. Elsewhere, we have
shown that bifurcational jumps in economic growth can occur when capital goods are
complementary to each other (Honkapohja and Turunen-Red (2002)). Since technologi-
cal complementarities and external influences on productivity (through sharing of ideas)
appear increasingly important in the most modern high-technology sectors, we believe
research on the eﬀects of economic policy should not ignore the possibility of large gains
in these settings.
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Appendices:
(A) Solving the Model at a Steady State for the entrepreneurial eﬀort
variables: The first-order conditions (8) yield the following equations:
nH : α(1− τH)nα−1H Ψ(NH) = cσH , (19)
nF : α(1− τF )nα−1F Ψ(NF ) = cσH , (20)
n∗F : α(1− τF )n
∗(α−1)
F Ψ(NF ) = c
∗ σ
F , (21)
n∗H : α(1− τH)n
∗(α−1)
H Ψ(NH) = c
∗ σ
F . (22)
In (19)-(22),
cH = (1− τH)nαHΨ(NH) + (1− τF )nαFΨ(NF ), (23)
c∗F = (1− τH)(n∗H)αΨ(NH) + (1− τF )(n∗F )αΨ(NF ), (24)
and, in (21)-(22) and (24), n∗H and n
∗
F denote the eﬀort that Foreign born entrepreneurs
invest in countries H and F , respectively.
Equations (19)-(22) give
nF = nH
·
Ψ(NF )
Ψ(NH)
(1− τF )
(1− τH)
¸ 1
1−α
≡ nHT
1
1−α , (25)
n∗H = n
∗
FT
1
α−1 . (26)
Further, using (23) and (25) in (19), we obtain
nH =
α
1
z (1− τH)
1
1−αΨ
1
1−α
H·
(1− τH)
1
1−αΨ
1
1−α
H + (1− τF )
1
1−αΨ
1
1−α
F
¸σ
z
, (27)
z ≡ 1− α(1− σ),
and symmetrically,
n∗F =
α
1
z (1− τF )
1
1−αΨ
1
1−α
F·
(1− τH)
1
1−αΨ
1
1−α
H + (1− τF )
1
1−αΨ
1
1−α
F
¸σ
z
. (28)
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Then, by (27) and (28), nH = n∗FT
1
α−1 which implies, using (26), that
nH = n∗H , (29)
nF = n∗F . (30)
Therefore, we can express the model solution in terms of nH and nF .
Using (27) and (28),
nH =
α
1
zx
(x+ y)
σ
z
, (31)
nF =
α
1
z y
(x+ y)
σ
z
, (32)
where
x ≡ (1− τH)
1
1−αΨ
1
1−α
H , y ≡ (1− τF )
1
1−αΨ
1
1−α
F , (33)
Ψj(nj) = max
·bI, λK(2nj)
1 + aλK(2nj)
¸β
, j = H,F. (34)
(B) Derivatives of Entrepreneurial Eﬀort with respect to taxes: Taking
logarithms and diﬀerentiating (31) and (32) with respect to τH yields:
AxbnH = Bx − CybnF , AybnF = Dx − CxbnH , (35)
where bnH ≡ dnH/dτHnH , bnF ≡ dnF/dτHnF , (36)
Ai ≡
·
1− β
1− α
·
1− σ
z
i
x+ y
¸
(1− aΨ
1
β
H)
¸
, i = x, y, (37)
Bx ≡ −
1
(1− α)(1− τH)
·
1− σ
z
x
x+ y
¸
, (38)
Ci ≡
σ
z
i
x+ y
β
(1− α)(1− aΨ
1
β
F ), i = x, y, (39)
Dx ≡
σ
z
x
x+ y
1
(1− α)(1− τH)
. (40)
At a symmetric equilibrium, Ax = Ay and Cx = Cy and x/(x+ y) = y/(x+ y) = 1/2 in
(37)-(40). Thus, given symmetry, (35) yields
bnH(A2x − C2x) = AxBx − CxDx, (41)
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where
A2x − C2x = (Ax − Cx)(Ax + Cx) (42)
=
·
1− β
1− α(1− aΨ
1
β
H)
¸ ·
1− β
1− α(1− aΨ
1
β
H)
³
1− σ
z
´¸
,
AxBx − CxDx = −
1
(1− α)(1− τH)
·³
1− σ
2z
´
− β
1− α(1− aΨ
1
β
H)
³
1− σ
z
´¸
. (43)
Expression (42) is positive if and only if
β
1− α(1− aΨ
1
β
H) < 1 or
β
1− α(1− aΨ
1
β
H) >
1
1− σz
, (44)
and negative otherwise, while (43) is positive if and only if
β
1− α(1− aΨ
1
β
H) <
1− σ
2z
1− σz
(<
1
1− σz
) (45)
and negative otherwise. Thus, we obtain that bnH < 0 if and only if
β
1− α(1− aΨ
1
β
H) < 1 or
1− σ
2z
1− σz
<
β
1− α(1− aΨ
1
β
H) <
1
1− σz
. (46)
Next, we apply (35) and (46) to completely describe the signs of bnH and bnF .
Case (i): Suppose bnH < 0 because β1−α(1 − aΨ 1βH) < 1. Then, by (37), Ax > 0 on
the left-hand side of (35), while the right-hand side is positive and so bnF > 0.
Case (i) occurs when there are no externalities, i.e., β = 0. Then, (35) yields
bnH = BxAx = − 1(1− α)(1− τH)
³
1− σ
2z
´
< 0, (47)
bnF = DxAx = σ2z 1(1− α)(1− τF ) > 0. (48)
Second, Case (i) applies when β > 0 but the equilibrium solution for entrepreneurial
eﬀort is too low for the positive externality appear, or using (34)
λK(2nH)
1 + aλK(2nH)
< bI ⇔ nH < nIˆ ≡ 12λK
" bI
1− abI
#
. (49)
Third, Case (i) occurs when the solution for nH is suﬃciently large so that the local
impact of the externality is small enough for the inequality β(1 − aΨ
1
β
H) < 1− α to be
satisfied. This requires
nH > n1 ≡
1
2aλK
·
β
1− α − 1
¸
. (50)
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Case (ii): Suppose bnH > 0 because 1 < β1−α(1− aΨ 1βH) < 11− σ
2z
. Then , Ax > 0 as in
Case (i) and from (35),
bnFAx = σ
2z
1
(1− α)(1− τH)
·
1 +
a(c− ab)
(1− a)(1− ab)
¸
, a ≡ β
1− α(1− aΨ
1
β
H), (51)
where the expressions b and c are obviously defined. We can write
1 +
a(c− ab)
(1− a)(1− ab) =
1− a(1 + b− c)
(1− a)(1− ab) , (52)
where (1−a) < 0 and (1−ab) > 0 because (1−ab) > 0 (i.e., a < 1
1−σz
). Given a < 1
1−σz
,
the numerator (1 − a(1 + b − c)) is positive. The right-hand side of (51) is therefore
negative, whereby bnF < 0. Thus in Case (ii), bnH > 0 and bnF < 0.
Case (ii) is observed when the equilibrium eﬀort satisfies the inequality
1
2aλK
·
β
R(1− α) − 1
¸
< nH < n1, R ≡
1
1− σ
2z
. (53)
Case (iii): Suppose bnH > 0 because 11− σ
2z
< β
1−α(1− aΨ
1
β
H) <
1− σ
2z
1−σz
. In this region,
Ax < 0 and expression (52) is positive, whereby bnF < 0. In Case (iii) as well, bnH > 0
and bnF < 0. This region corresponds to the n-values
n3 ≡
1
2aλK
·
β
S(1− α) − 1
¸
< nH <
1
2aλK
·
β
R(1− α) − 1
¸
, S ≡
1− σ
2z
1− σz
(54)
Case (iv): Suppose bnH < 0 because 1− σ2z1−σz < β1−α(1 − aΨ 1βH) < 11−σz . Then, Ax < 0
and because the right-hand side of the expression for bnF in (35) is positive, we obtainbnF < 0. In Case (iv), bnH < 0 and bnF < 0. The corresponding inequality for nH is
n4 ≡
1
2aλK
·
β
T (1− α) − 1
¸
< nH < n3, T ≡
1
1− σz
.
Case (v): Suppose bnH > 0 because β1−α(1− aΨ 1βH) > 11−σz . Then, Ax < 0 and (52)
is negative. In Case (v), bnH > 0 and bnF > 0. This case occurs if nH < n4.
By calculations analogous to above and by appealing to symmetry,
bnH = dnF/dτFnF , dnH/dτFnH = bnF ,
and dn∗F/dτF = dnH/dτH and dn
∗
H/dτF = dnF/dτH . Accordingly, the n-derivatives are
completely characterized by the expressions for bnH and bnF .
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Finally, we determine the sign of
³
∂nH
∂τH
+ ∂nF∂τH
´
representing the response in individual
entrepreneurial eﬀort to a domestic tax increase. At a symmetric equilibrium, we have
∂nH
∂τH
+
∂nF
∂τH
= nH [bnH + bnF ] , (55)
and so the sign of (55) is determined by the sign of (bnH + bnF ). From (35), we obtain
bnH + bnF = Bx +DxAx + Cx = −
1
(1−α)(1−τ)(1−
σ
z )
1− β
1−α(1− aΨ
1
β )(1− σz )
. (56)
The numerator of (56) is negative and the denominator is positive if and only if
β
1− α(1− aΨ
1
β ) <
1
1− σz
. (57)
Thus, bnH + bnF < 0 if and only if Cases (i)-(iv) hold.
(C) The oﬀer curves in Figure 1: Oﬀer curves are characterized by the equation
nt = 2−σα(1− τ )1−σ(nαt+1Ψt+1)1−σ, (58)
Ψt+1 = max
·bI, λNt+1
1 + aλNt+1
¸β
. (59)
Since 0 < α(1 − σ) < 1, nt is an increasing and concave function of nt+1 if Ψt+1 is a
constant. This yields the first concave segment along the oﬀer curves in Figure 1.
For values of nt+1 at which Ψt+1 is not a constant (to the right from the kink on oﬀer
curves in Figure 1) equation (58) gives
∂nt
∂nt+1
= L(1− σ)y1−σ
·
∂yt+1
∂nt+1
1
yt+1
¸
= L(1− σ)
·
y1−σt+1
nt+1
¸
yn > 0, (60)
∂2nt
∂n2t+1
=
L(1− σ)
nt+1
·
y1−σt+1
nt+1
yn((1− σ)yn − 1) + y1−σt+1
∂yn
∂n
¸
, (61)
where L = 2−σα(1− τ )1−σ and
yn ≡
(dy/dn)n
y
= α+ β(1− aΨ
1
β ) = α+
β
1 + aλN
(62)
is the elasticity of individual output with respect to eﬀort. The sign of the derivative (61)
determines the curvature of the oﬀer curve. Because
∂yn
∂n
= − 2aλ
(1 + 2aλn)2
< 0 (63)
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in (61), the oﬀer curve (58) is concave if
(1− σ)yn − 1 < 0⇔ n > n ≡
1
2aλK
·
(1− σ)(α+ β)
1− (1− σ)α − 1
¸
. (64)
Observing that
(1− σ)(α+ β)
1− (1− σ)α − 1 <
β
1− α − 1, (65)
we obtain that condition (64) is satisfied when n > n1, i.e., in Case i) of Appendix
B. If there are no productive externalities, we obtain the first concave segment of the
oﬀer curves in Figure 1. When externalities are operative (nt+1 > nbI), condition (64)
determines a range of high values of nt+1 for which the oﬀer curve is concave. Concavity
holds even for values of nt+1 that are somewhat smaller than n because ∂yn/∂n < 0 in
(61). Thus, the second concave segment of the oﬀer curves exists when nt+1 is suﬃciently
large.
The oﬀer curve is convex if yn > 1/(1 − σ) and such that (61) is positive. Using
(64), it is evident that such convex segments, if they occur, can only appear when nt+1
is between the low value nbI at which the externality appears and the high value n at
which the oﬀer curve already is concave. Thus, the oﬀer curves in Figure 1 conform to
the general description obtained from equation (58).
(D) Welfare as a function of the tax rate in Figure 2: In this appendix, we
evaluate ∂WH/∂τH + ∂WH/∂τF at a symmetric equilibrium, determining the slope of
the curves W (τ ) in Figure 2. Using (13),
∂WH
∂τH
= U 0
·
∂cH
∂τH
¸
−
·
∂nH
∂τH
+
∂nF
∂τH
¸
+ µU 0
·
τH
∂Y TH
∂τH
+ Y TH
¸
, (66)
∂WH
∂τF
= U 0
·
∂cH
∂τF
¸
−
·
∂nH
∂τF
+
∂nF
∂τF
¸
+ µU 0
·
τH
∂Y TH
∂τF
¸
, (67)
where Y TH = f(nH , NH) + f(n
∗
H ,NH) is the total (per capita) output in H.
Furthermore, since cH = (1−τH)f(nHt, NHt)+(1−τF )f(nFt, NFt) at a steady state,
∂cH
∂τH
= −f(nH , NH) + (1− τ)(f 01 + 2f 0N)
·
∂nH
∂τH
+
∂nF
∂τH
¸
, (68)
∂cH
∂τF
= −f(nF ,NF ) + (1− τ)(f 01 + 2f 0N)
·
∂nH
∂τF
+
∂nF
∂τF
¸
, (69)
and
∂Y TH
∂τH
= 2(f 01 + 2f
0
N)
∂nH
∂τH
,
∂Y TH
∂τF
= 2(f 01 + 2f
0
N )
∂nH
∂τF
(70)
The derivatives of nH and nF with respect to the tax variables are discussed in Appendix
B above.
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Next, we substitute (68)-(70) into (66)-(67) and apply (11) to obtain
∂WH
∂τH
= −U 0(cH)f(nH ,NH) + µU 0(GH)Y TH (71)
+2µτU 0(GH)(f 01 + 2f
0
N )
∂nH
∂τH
+ 2U 0(cH)(1− τ )f 0N
·
∂nH
∂τH
+
∂nF
∂τH
¸
,
∂WH
∂τF
= −U 0(cH)f(nF , NF ) + 2µτU 0(GH)(f 01 + 2f 0N)
∂nH
∂τF
(72)
+2U 0(cH)(1− τ )f 0N
·
∂nH
∂τF
+
∂nF
∂τF
¸
.
Therefore, by symmetry
∂WH
∂τH
+
∂WH
∂τF
= µU 0(GH)Y TH − U 0(cH) [f(nH ,NH) + f(nF , NF )] (73)
+2µτU 0(GH)(f 01 + 2f
0
N )
·
∂nH
∂τH
+
∂nH
∂τF
¸
+4U 0(cH)(1− τ )f 0N
·
∂nH
∂τH
+
∂nF
∂τH
¸
.
The first term on the right-hand side of (73) is positive and the other terms are negative
as long as condition (57) of Appendix B is satisfied, which corresponds to Cases (i)-(iv).
The sum of the first two terms on the right-hand side of (73) equals
[µU 0(GH)− U 0(cH)]Y TH = [µτ−σ − (1− τ)−σ](Y TH )1−σ. (74)
When τ approaches zero, the term (74) in (73) grows large whereby (73) eventually
must be positive. Thus, when τ is suﬃciently small, welfare is increasing in the common
value of τ . However, as τ increases, the other (negative) terms in (73) will eventually
dominate. Then, welfare in decreasing in τ .
When the productive externality eﬀect is very large so that condition (57) is violated
(this is Case (v) of Appendix B), the previously negative third and fourth terms on the
right-hand side of (73) become positive. This means that, given very strong externality,
welfare can be an increasing function of τ for a wider range of τ -values (in Figure 2,
W (τ) curves shift to the right).
(E) Unilateral incentives to lower the tax rate at a local optimum: A locally
jointly optimal (symmetric) tax rate, τ opt, satisfies the first order condition·
∂W j
∂τH
+
∂W j
∂τF
¸
|τopt= 0, j = H,F, (75)
and the derivative expressions are defined in (73). Clearly, ∂WH/∂τH < 0 if and only if
∂WH/∂τF > 0.
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Using (72) and taking into account (75), we obtain
∂WH
∂τF
| τopt = YH
·
U 0(cH)
2
− µU 0(GH)
¸
− 2µτU 0(GH)(f 01 + 2f 0N )
∂nH
∂τH
(76)
−2U 0(cH)(1− τ )f 0N
·
∂nH
∂τH
+
∂nF
∂τH
¸
.
The signs of the n-derivatives in (76) can vary. Three possibilities arise.
First, in Cases (i) and (iv) of Appendix B, the second and third terms of (76) are
positive. The first term positive as well if
MRScG ≡
U 0(cH)
µU 0(GH)
=
1
µ
·
τ opt
1− τ opt
¸σ
> 2. (77)
This condition is satisfied when the utility weight of public services µ tends to zero..
Thus, for suﬃciently low values of µ, (76) is positive in Cases (i) and (iv) of Appendix
B. For higher µ the incentive to lower the domestic tax is weakened but it can still exist.
Second, in Cases (ii) and (iii) of Appendix B, the second term on the right-hand side
of (76) is negative but the third term is positive. Then ∂WH/∂τH is less negative than
in the previous case, implying that Nash equilibrium occurs at a higher level of taxation.
Third, in Case (v) of Appendix B, both the second and third terms of 76) are negative.
In this case, when the externality is very strong, it is likely that ∂WH/∂τH > 0 unless
the weight of public consumption in preferences is very low. In this case, therefore, the
Nash equilibrium is likely to involve taxes higher than jointly optimal.
(F) Externality parameters and the cut-oﬀ tax, τ cut: The cut-oﬀ tax is ob-
tained from (17) and (18). Equation (18) defines a downward sloping curve in (τ , n)-
space, and the slope of this curve equals
∂n(τ)
∂τ
= −2−σz α 1z bI β(1−σ)z (1− σ)
z
(1− τ ) 1−σz −1 (< 0). (78)
Since
∂Ψ(n)
∂n
= β
µ
2λKn
1 + 2aλKn
¶β−1
2λK
(1 + 2aλKn)2
(> 0), (79)
a reduction in a and and increase in λK both increase the slope (79) thus reducing the
cut-oﬀ value of n. Using (18) this means that the cut-oﬀ tax increases.
When β increases, the function curve n(τ ) and the slope (79) both increase. Together,
these changes imply that the cut-oﬀ tax increases. When bI decreases, the cut-oﬀ value
of n clearly declines. However, the reduction in bI also causes a reduction in the slope
(78) and it is possible that the cut-oﬀ tax also declines.
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Figure 1: Offer Curves and Steady States
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Figure 3: Effort Regions in the High Regime
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